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ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

Inclosure 1 Missing

USAF review(s)
completed.

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AMM Subcommittee (Background)

1. During the past eighteen months the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Committee has been working with intelligence on the Soviet program for defending against ballistic missiles. The Soviet program includes new missile system technologies, not yet fully understood in the U. S. intelligence community. The strategic implications of the Soviet program, both for offensive and defensive U. S. missile programs, have only recently been appreciated by U. S. strategic planners.

2. It is considered vital for U. S. strategic planners to have timely and continuous intelligence on the Soviet AMM program. The intelligence community should take steps to furnish such intelligence. Such steps would reduce the degree and number of the following deficiencies in this intelligence:

a. Analyst Education on Defenses Against Ballistic Missiles. AMM technologies are so new to the intelligence community (and to U. S. design analysts) that there are very few competent analysts or consultants. The intelligence analyst must know something about U. S. missile and air defense technologies and programs. He must understand the nature of the missile threat to the Soviets in terms of numbers and vulnerabilities of U. S. missiles. He

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must have a working knowledge of the actual ballistic missile targets being used by the Soviets in their AMM program.

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There are

^{few} analysts today who have the background competence to do AMM systems work; however, such competence can be developed within the intelligence community through deliberate planning and directed effort.

b. Adequacy of Analysis Programs. The first thing needed is a re-

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development of the gaps in analysis.

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design features of U. S. ballistic missile warheads are now established.

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c. Adequacy of Collection Programs. There has been little specific correlation between current intelligence gaps and planned collection programs. There is not available to the intelligence community a simple table showing a column of gaps versus a column of collection programs to fill these gaps.

Indeed, the mass of the collection effort is merely a re-direction of programs 25X1

25X1 (or plans) originally designed for other functions.

d. Influence on National Estimates. Because of the newness of the AMM

technologies, the writers of the various national estimates derived from NIE 11-5 have tried to avoid a straightforward discussion of the effects on strategic power of the Soviet program. The uncertainties in GMAIC about the functions of each specific AMM development has been interpreted in the derived estimates as uncertainties about the whole Soviet program. The AMM programs must be made clear to the intelligence community and to national planners rather than the functions of parts. It is the programs which are the base for strategy.

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It seems that new intelligence must be sold rather than stated factually.

If this is the case, then someone must sell this new type of missile intelligence.

Those who have investigated the problem conclude that this has not been done and

that there is little understanding of the strategic implications of Soviet AMM

systems.

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